Localized Bargaining: The Political Economy of China's High-Speed Railway Program

Xiao Ma's book "Localized Bargaining" provides a novel theory of intergovernmental bargaining that explains the rollout of China's high-speed railway program. It shows how local governments play a complex role in the allocation of investment, leveraging institutional and extra-institutional sources of bargaining power in their competition for railway stations.

Format: Hardback
Length: 248 pages
Publication date: 07 July 2022
Publisher: Oxford University Press Inc

China's high-speed railway network is one of the largest infrastructure programs in human history. Despite global media coverage, we know very little about the political process that led the government to invest in the railway program and the reasons for the striking regional and temporal variation in such investments. In Localized Bargaining, Xiao Ma offers a novel theory of intergovernmental bargaining that explains the unfolding of China's unprecedented high-speed railway program. Drawing on a wealth of in-depth interviews, original data sets, and surveys with local officials, Ma details how the bottom-up bargaining efforts by territorial authorities—whom the central bureaucracies rely on to implement various infrastructure projects—shaped the allocation of investment in the railway system. Demonstrating how localities of different types invoke institutional and extra-institutional sources of bargaining power in their competition for railway stations, Ma sheds new light on how the nation's massive bureaucracy actually functions.

China's high-speed railway network is a massive infrastructure project that has garnered global attention. Despite extensive media coverage, there is limited understanding of the political process that led to the government's investment in this program and the factors that influenced the varying levels of investment across different regions and time periods. In his book Localized Bargaining, Xiao Ma presents a novel theory of intergovernmental bargaining that sheds light on the development of China's high-speed railway program. Through in-depth interviews, original data sets, and surveys with local officials, Ma explores how the bottom-up bargaining efforts of territorial authorities played a crucial role in shaping the allocation of investment in the railway system.

Ma's theory of localized bargaining suggests that the central government relies on territorial authorities to implement various infrastructure projects. These authorities have the power to negotiate with the central government and other stakeholders to secure funding and resources for their projects. The bargaining process is influenced by a range of institutional and extra-institutional sources of bargaining power, including the political influence of local leaders, the economic interests of local communities, and the regulatory environment of the government.

One of the key findings of Ma's research is that localities of different types invoke different sources of bargaining power in their competition for railway stations. For example, cities with higher economic development and population density tend to have more bargaining power due to their greater ability to generate revenue and attract investment. In contrast, rural areas with limited economic resources may rely on political influence and government subsidies to secure investment.

Ma's analysis also reveals that the bargaining process is influenced by a range of contextual factors, including the political stability of the region, the level of infrastructure development in neighboring regions, and the availability of alternative transportation options. For example, regions with stable political environments and well-developed infrastructure may be more attractive to investors, leading to higher levels of investment in the railway system.

Overall, Localized Bargaining provides a valuable insight into the complex role of local governments in the rollout of China's high-speed railway program. By exploring the bargaining process between territorial authorities and the central government, Ma sheds new light on how the nation's massive bureaucracy actually functions. His theory of localized bargaining offers a valuable framework for understanding the dynamics of intergovernmental bargaining and the factors that influence investment decisions in infrastructure projects.

Weight: 486g
Dimension: 240 x 160 x 15 (mm)
ISBN-13: 9780197638910